The Paradox of Not Trusting Competent People in Aviation

By Florin Necula, PhD | Maintenance Manager & Licensed Aircraft Engineer
Aug 24^th, 2025

Aviation is one of the most competence-driven industries in the world. Licensed engineers and pilots spend years in rigorous training before they are allowed anywhere near operational responsibility. Their training schools and examination centers must themselves be approved and closely monitored. Examinations are standardized, records are checked, and approvals are audited.

In other words, even before an individual becomes licensed, their competence is shaped and verified inside a system of oversight.

And yet, paradoxically, once these people are finally certified as competent, the system does not stop checking them — in fact, the monitoring multiplies.

Layers upon layers of oversight

Take a licensed engineer or a Nominated Person as an example. Their work is never accepted on trust alone, even though the system itself has already defined and certified them as competent. Instead, the oversight layers build up like this:

• Engineers and pilots: trained in approved schools and centres, monitored by authorities.
• Licensed engineers: monitored by their organisation’s compliance system.
• Nominated Persons (Flight Operations, Continuing Airworthiness, Maintenance etc.): monitored by Compliance Monitoring and Safety Management Systems.
• Compliance systems themselves: audited annually through independent audits, mandated by the Competent Authority.
• Organisations: audited by the Competent Authority.
• Competent Authorities: monitored by EASA.

Each layer is designed to provide assurance that the layer beneath is working as intended. Even the monitors must themselves be monitored.

At first glance, this creates a strange picture: a system that invests so much in defining competence but then behaves as though it cannot fully trust that competence once it is certified.

Why the system is built this way

The paradox is deliberate. The EASA philosophy is built on the idea that safety must never rely on individual competence alone — no matter how well-trained or experienced the professional may be.

The reasoning is sound:

• Even the most competent people are still human, and therefore fallible.
• Organisations can drift into unsafe practices over time without noticing.
• Independent oversight brings new perspectives, reducing the risk of blind spots.

Seen this way, oversight is not distrust — it is structural humility. It recognises that errors and deviations can creep in anywhere and creates multiple defences to prevent them from reaching the sharp end.

When the meaning is lost

But in practice, the intent is not always applied as designed. Instead of complementing competence, oversight can drift into bureaucracy:

• Independent audits sometimes generate findings on trivial clerical errors, while operational risks receive less attention.
• Professionals end up spending more time preparing for audits than exercising their skills and judgment.
• Compliance becomes a “box-ticking” exercise — passing the audit takes precedence over addressing real safety issues.

In these situations, the paradox sharpens. Oversight no longer reinforces competence — it undermines it, sending the message that professional expertise cannot be trusted.

A call for balance: competence as foundation, oversight as complement

The key is not to reject oversight, but to restore balance.

• Competence must be recognised as the foundation of aviation safety. Without competent engineers, pilots and managers, oversight has nothing meaningful to monitor.
• Oversight must act as a complement to competence, not a substitute for it. Its role is to confirm that systems are functioning, to provide learning, and to catch what individuals or organisations might miss — not to micro-manage highly qualified professionals.
• Audits and monitoring must focus on meaningful risks. Trivial findings that add paperwork, but no safety value, only erode trust and motivation.

Trust itself is a safety enabler. Competent professionals who feel trusted are more engaged, more responsible and more motivated to go beyond the minimum.

Conclusion

The paradox of not trusting competent people is deeply embedded in the aviation regulatory system. From training schools to licensed engineers, from Nominated Persons to national authorities, every layer is monitored by another.

The logic of this system is clear — to build resilience through multiple defences. But when the true meaning is lost, oversight turns into bureaucracy and competence is undervalued.

The way forward is not to add more regulation, but to apply the existing rules with wisdom, proportionality and above all, trust.

Competence must remain the foundation. Oversight must be the complement.

Without competence, trust is blind. Without trust, competence is wasted. Together, they are the balance that keeps aviation safe.