The Aircraft Does Not Care About Your Licence — It Cares About Your Competence
By Florin Necula, PhD | Accountable Manager & Licensed Aircraft Engineer
Jun 26th, 2026
Some time ago, I became aware of a case where a person was assessed for a limited certifying staff authorisation.
The scope was not excessive. The expectations were clear. The person had been exposed to practical work for a significant period of time. The assessment was performed independently, by competent assessors and more than once. The result was consistent: the required standard was not achieved.
A few weeks later, I understood that the same person had been authorised elsewhere for a broader certifying staff role.
This article is not about that individual. It is not about criticising another organisation. And it is certainly not about blocking people’s careers. Aircraft maintenance needs people. Young technicians need opportunities. Licensed engineers need progression. Organisations need certifying staff.
But precisely because the industry needs certifying staff, we should be honest enough to ask a difficult question:
Are we always assessing competence or are we sometimes authorising availability?
The uncomfortable gap between licence and competence
In aircraft maintenance, we sometimes speak about the Part-66 licence as if it were the final proof of competence. It is not.
A licence is an essential prerequisite. It demonstrates that a person has met defined knowledge, examination, experience and rating requirements. It gives a legal foundation for privileges. But the licence alone does not prove that the person is competent to exercise those privileges in a specific organisation, on a specific aircraft configuration, within a specific operational environment, under real commercial and time pressure.
That is why the Part-145 organisation remains responsible for issuing the certification authorisation. And before doing so, the organisation must assess whether the person is competent, qualified and capable to perform the intended certifying duties.
This distinction is fundamental.
A licence says: you may be eligible.
An authorisation should say: we have evidence that you are competent for this scope, in this organisation, under these conditions.
The two are connected, but they are not the same.
Competence is not a document
Competence in aircraft maintenance is more than theoretical knowledge. It is more than experience counted in years. It is more than a type rating. It is more than confidence. And it is certainly more than a daily rate.
Competence is demonstrated in decisions: when an engineer follows maintenance data under pressure, stops and asks for support rather than improvising, records defects properly and recognises the limits of their own knowledge.
In this sense, competence is not only technical. It is behavioural. It includes judgement, attitude, discipline, communication and respect for procedures.
This is where aircraft maintenance becomes uncomfortable. A person may be licensed and still not yet be ready for a certain certifying scope. A person may have many years in aviation and still have weak procedural discipline. A person may speak confidently in an interview and still struggle when asked to explain how they would actually manage a real defect, a maintenance data which is ambiguous or an operational pressure.
And sometimes the opposite is also true: a modest, careful engineer may be more competent than a very confident one.
When market pressure meets competence
We should not pretend that the industry is operating in ideal conditions.
There is a shortage of certifying staff in Europe and in many other parts of the world. Aircraft utilisation is high, MRO capacity is under pressure, experienced engineers are moving or retiring, and approved organisations need people on the roster.
This creates a real risk: the person who is available starts to look competent enough.
In a tight labour market, the standard can move without anyone openly admitting it. The assessment becomes shorter. The interview becomes more forgiving. Previous authorisations are accepted with limited challenge. Practical observation becomes reduced. The need to cover the operation quietly influences the judgement.
Nobody says, “Let us lower the standard.”
But the standard can still move.
There is another uncomfortable issue.
Some licensed staff may start to confuse high market value with high competence.
High rates may reflect scarcity, flexibility, mobility, night shift availability, AOG response, or simply shortage of supply. They do not automatically reflect depth of knowledge, procedural discipline, safety judgement or release-to-service maturity.
The market can price availability. It cannot reliably measure competence.
For certifying staff, this distinction matters. The signature is not an administrative act. It is a professional judgement that maintenance has been properly performed and the aircraft can be released to service.
That judgement requires competence and humility.
The regulatory “hot potato”
The current system distributes responsibility across several layers.
EASA defines the regulatory framework.
The Competent Authority issues licences, approves organisations and oversees compliance.
The Part-145 organisation issues certification authorisations.
The Compliance Monitoring function checks whether the organisation follows its procedures.
The Safety Management System should identify whether the process creates operational risk.
In theory, this is a strong chain.
But in practice, competence can become a responsibility passed along the chain rather than a standard collectively defended by the chain.
EASA may say the organisation must assess competence.
The Competent Authority may verify that the organisation has an approved procedure.
The organisation may say the person holds a licence and previous authorisations.
Compliance may verify that the form is completed.
Safety may only become involved after an occurrence.
And everyone can be technically correct.
But the aircraft does not care that the form was completed.
The aircraft does not care that the licence was valid.
The aircraft does not care that the audit checklist had no finding.
The aircraft only “cares” whether the maintenance was performed correctly and whether the person signing the release had the competence, judgement and integrity to do so.
Who assesses the assessors?
This also raises another uncomfortable question:
Who assesses the competence of those who assess competence?
If a trainee or certifying staff candidate who is not yet competent passes an assessment, the issue may not stop with the candidate. It also calls into question the competence, independence and judgement of the assessor. Then the next question follows naturally: who approved that assessor and on what evidence? Was the Nominated Person satisfied that the assessor had the technical depth, operational maturity and safety judgement required to make such a decision? And beyond the organisation, how deeply does the Competent Authority evaluate the competence of the Nominated Person and the effectiveness of the authorisation system? In theory, each layer should provide assurance. In practice, it can become a closed circle, where everyone assumes the previous layer has controlled the risk.
Do audits really see competence?
This is where we need to be honest.
If a person can fail a structured competence assessment in one organisation and shortly afterwards be authorised elsewhere, what exactly are audits detecting?
Internal audits and Competent Authority oversight are necessary. But are they always effective in identifying weak competence assessment or do they mainly verify that a procedure exists and that records are completed?
A file can look compliant.
The licence is present.
The continuation training is recorded.
The authorisation form is signed.
The MOE procedure exists.
But does the file prove that the person can make safe certification decisions under operational pressure?
Sometimes yes. Sometimes perhaps not.
This is not an argument against audits. It is an argument against overestimating what audits can see when they focus mainly on procedural evidence rather than decision quality.
Competence is not only in the record. It is in the quality of the judgement behind the record.
Could EASA have done this more standardised?
In my view, yes.
The regulatory framework contains the right principles. It recognises that licence, authorisation and competence are not identical. It places responsibility on the organisation to assess certifying staff before authorisation. It recognises the need for knowledge, skills, attitude and experience.
But the practical standardisation of competence assessment remains weaker than it should be.
Across organisations, assessment depth may vary significantly. Assessor competence may vary. Practical observation may vary. Interview difficulty may vary. Treatment of previous failures may vary. The evidence required before granting authorisation may vary. The threshold between “not yet competent” and “acceptable” may vary.
This is a problem in a European system that otherwise aims for harmonisation.
I am not suggesting that EASA should create one single European interview for every certifying staff authorisation. Organisations are different. Aircraft configurations are different. Line and base maintenance environments are different. Local procedures matter.
But EASA and the competent authorities could provide stronger minimum expectations for what a robust certifying staff competence assessment should include.
Competence assessment should protect the engineer too
A strong assessment process should not be seen as hostile.
It protects the organisation.
It protects the operator.
It protects the passenger.
It protects the aircraft.
But it also protects the certifying staff.
Being authorised beyond one’s real competence is not a career opportunity. It is a professional trap.
When something goes wrong, the same system that was flexible during authorisation may become very strict during investigation. The engineer’s signature will be examined. The maintenance data will be examined. The decision-making process will be examined. The question will not be: “Was the industry short of staff?” The question will be: “Was this person competent and authorised to certify this work?”
That is why honest competence assessment is not an administrative barrier. It is a safety defence.
We need more certifying staff – but not at any price
The industry needs certifying staff. That is clear.
But aviation does not only need more signatures. It needs more competent signatures.
The solution to staff shortage cannot be to dilute the meaning of authorisation. The solution must be better training, better mentoring, better OJT, better assessment, better career pathways.
Competence must remain non-negotiable.
Not because organisations want to be difficult.
Not because assessors enjoy saying no.
Not because regulations require another form.
But because the certificate of release to service is one of the last professional barriers between maintenance error and flight operation.
And that barrier is only as strong as the competence of the person signing it.
