From Organisational Safety to Individual Competence
Completing the Safety Model in Aircraft Maintenance
By Florin Necula, PhD | Maintenance Manager & Licensed Aircraft Engineer
Dec 14th, 2025
Introduction
The evolution of aviation safety has been characterized by successive conceptual shifts in how risk, error and responsibility are understood. Each shift has been driven by improved scientific insight and operational experience and each has contributed materially to the industry’s exceptional safety record.
One of the most influential transitions was the movement away from individual blame toward organisational and systemic safety models. Grounded in Human Factors (HF) research, this transition reframed human error as a symptom of systemic conditions rather than an isolated cause (Reason, 1990; Reason, 1997). The adoption of Safety Management Systems (SMS) and Just Culture principles embedded this perspective into regulation and practice (ICAO, 2018; Dekker, 2016).
However, as organisational safety paradigms have matured, a critical dimension risks being underemphasised: the competence of the individual professional. This article argues that the next step in safety evolution is not a rejection of organisational safety, but its completion—through a deliberate re-centring of individual competence as the system’s primary active safety element.
Early Safety Thinking: Individual Responsibility and Blame
In the early decades of aviation, safety was largely conceptualised as an individual responsibility. Maintenance errors were typically attributed to the technician involved, often framed as lapses in attention, discipline or skill. Investigations sought proximate human causes and corrective actions focused on retraining or disciplinary measures.
While this approach reinforced accountability, it failed to address the broader operational and organisational context in which errors occurred. Factors such as workload, fatigue, inadequate tooling, ambiguous documentation and managerial pressure were rarely examined in depth. As a result, similar failures tended to recur, suggesting that individual-focused explanations were insufficient to capture the complexity of real-world operations.
The Systemic Turn: Organisational Safety and Human Factors
The development of Human Factors science in the latter half of the twentieth century fundamentally altered safety thinking. Research in cognitive psychology and organisational theory demonstrated that human performance is shaped – and often constrained – by system design (Reason, 1990).
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model illustrated how accidents emerge from the interaction between active failures and latent organisational conditions, such as inadequate procedures, training gaps or cultural pressures (Reason, 1997). This insight shifted attention away from individual culpability toward organisational responsibility.
These concepts were progressively embedded in aviation regulation through the introduction of Safety Management Systems, which emphasise hazard identification, risk management, safety assurance and continuous improvement (ICAO, 2018). Just Culture frameworks further reinforced the distinction between acceptable error, at-risk behaviour, and negligence, fostering reporting and learning rather than punishment (Dekker, 2016).
This systemic turn represented a major advance. Organisational safety models significantly improved transparency, learning and risk control across aviation maintenance organisations.
Organisational Safety as the Dominant Paradigm
Today, organisational safety frameworks constitute the dominant paradigm in aviation maintenance. Safety performance is primarily managed and assessed through:
- SMS processes and governance structures
- Compliance with procedures and audits
- Training programmes and regulatory conformity
Within this paradigm, safety is often treated as an emergent property of organisational systems – something embedded in processes, documentation and oversight mechanisms.
While this perspective remains essential, its dominance has introduced an unintended conceptual imbalance. By locating explanatory power primarily at the organisational level, the role of the individual risks being reframed as largely passive: an operator of systems rather than an active safety agent.
The Role of Individual Competence in Safety Production
Organisational safety systems are, by definition, passive. Procedures do not adapt to novel situations; checklists do not interpret ambiguous data; software does not exercise judgment. These defences require a competent individual to enact them effectively.
In aviation maintenance, particularly in line and operational environments, non-standard situations are frequent. Unanticipated defects, incomplete technical information, time pressure and competing operational demands require more than procedural compliance. They require competence, defined as the ability to apply knowledge, skills and judgment effectively in context (ICAO, 2016).
The individual maintenance professional represents the system’s:
- Final decision-maker
- Only adaptive and context-sensitive element
- Last opportunity to detect, mitigate or halt unsafe conditions
Empirical research in training and human performance confirms that organisational investment in training does not guarantee uniform competence outcomes. Variability in aptitude, experience, motivation and cognitive load significantly influences performance (Salas et al., 2012). Consequently, safety cannot be assured solely through organisational controls.
Re-Centring Competence Without Reverting to Blame
Re-centring individual competence does not imply a return to blame-based safety models. Rather, it reflects a more complete application of Human Factors principles, one that acknowledges both systemic influence and individual agency.
Just Culture explicitly recognises accountability as a necessary component of safety, provided it is fair, transparent and proportionate (Dekker, 2016). Within this framework, competence is not a moral judgment, but a professional requirement that must be assessed, maintained and demonstrated.
Competency-Based Training and Assessment (CBTA) offers a practical mechanism for integrating individual competence into system-based safety models. By focusing on demonstrated performance in realistic operational scenarios, CBTA shifts emphasis from training inputs to safety-relevant outputs (ICAO, 2016; EASA, 2020).
Completing the Safety Model
The historical evolution of aviation safety can be understood as cumulative rather than cyclical:
- Individual-focused safety emphasised accountability but neglected context
- Organisational safety addressed context but risked diluting individual agency
- Re-centred individual competence completes the model by integrating both
A complete safety model recognises that:
- Organisations design, enable and sustain safety systems
- Individuals enact, adapt and ultimately deliver safety outcomes
Competence is therefore not an alternative to organisational safety, but its essential active component.
Conclusion
Aviation maintenance safety has matured through its embrace of organisational and systemic approaches and these remain foundational. However, safety systems do not operate independently of the people within them. They depend on competent individuals to interpret, apply and, when necessary, compensate for their limitations.
The next evolution in safety thinking lies in deliberately re-centring individual competence, not as a retreat from systemic thinking, but as its logical completion. By doing so, the industry acknowledges the maintenance professional not as a risk to be managed, but as the most critical safety asset within the system.
References
Dekker, S. (2016). Just Culture: Restoring Trust and Accountability in Your Organization (3rd ed.). CRC Press.
EASA. (2020). Guidance Material on Competency-Based Training and Assessment (CBTA). European Union Aviation Safety Agency.
ICAO. (2016). Manual on Competency-Based Training and Assessment (Doc 9868). International Civil Aviation Organization.
ICAO. (2018). Safety Management Manual (SMM), Doc 9859 (4th ed.). International Civil Aviation Organization.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate Publishing.
Salas, E., Tannenbaum, S. I., Kraiger, K., & Smith-Jentsch, K. A. (2012). The science of training and development in organizations. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 13(2), 74–101.
